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COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 1:07-cv-01677-JBS) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
 
EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF AN 
ORDER 
OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, CAMDEN 
(B.C. No. 06-14240) 
Bankruptcy Judge: Honorable Gloria M. Burns 
______________ 
 
Argued: September 20, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
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(Opinion Filed:  August 6, 2012) 
______________ 
 
David A. Kasen (argued)       
Kasen & Kasen 
Society Hill Office Park, Suite 3 
1874 East Marlton Pike (Route 70) 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003-2044 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
Steven R. Neuner (argued) 
Neuner and Ventura LLP 
Willow Ridge Executive Office Park 
750 Route 73 South, Suite 210 
Marlton, NJ 08053-4133 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Stergios and Renee Messina (“Appellants”) appeal the 
January 31, 2011 Order of the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, issued after the District Court’s appellate 
review of the final order of the Bankruptcy Court.  The 
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s March 6, 
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2006 Order granting Appellee’s1  motion to value Appellants’ 
exemption at zero and denying Appellants’ cross-motion for 
an order requiring Appellee to pay Appellants the exemptions 
claimed in their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  In its 2007 
Opinion, the District Court decided the issue in favor of the 
debtors (Appellants), reversing the Bankruptcy Court, and 
holding that the Trustee’s late objection to Debtors’ claimed 
exemptions were barred under Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz
 
, 
503 U.S. 638 (1992).   
On remand, the District Court determined whether, in 
light of the additional guidance provided by the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Schwab v. Reilly, _U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 2652 
(2010), the Trustee has a duty to object to the Debtors’ 
claimed exemptions within the 30-day limit imposed by Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 4003(b).  The District Court found that the 
Trustee had no duty to object within 30 days under Schwab
 
 
and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s holding.  The Debtors 
appealed.  For the reasons below, we shall affirm the District 
Court’s Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On July 5, 2002, Renee Messina obtained a loan from 
National Penn Bank, secured by an $118,000 mortgage on 
residential property owned by her and her husband Stergios.  
Appellants later executed a second mortgage on their 
residence with Aames Funding Corporation, d/b/a Aames 
                                                 
1 Appellee in this action is the attorney of record and is also 
referred to as “Trustee.”  Appellants are also referred to as 
“Debtors.” 
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Home Loan for $118,000.  The second mortgage was serviced 
by Litton Home Loans.   
 
In May 2006, Appellants filed a voluntary Chapter 7 
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of New Jersey, along with the accompanying Bankruptcy 
Schedules. On Schedule A, entitled Real Property, Appellants 
listed their primary residence and valued the residential 
property at $230,000.  Appellants submitted an amended 
Schedule C, where they claimed two exemptions in their 
residence.  In the “Description of Property” column of 
Schedule C, the asset in which Appellants claimed an 
exemption is their residence, described as “251 Weymouth 
Rd., Mullica Township, NJ.” (See
 
 Appellants’ Br. at 1.)  In 
the column labeled “Specify Law Providing Each 
Exemption,” the Appellants listed 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and 
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).  In the column labeled “Value of 
Claimed Exemption,” the Appellants listed $36,900 for the § 
522(d)(1) exemption and $250 for the § 522(d)(5) exemption.  
These are the maximum exemptions allowed under the 
statutory provisions cited.  In the column labeled “Current 
Value of Property Without Deducting Exemption,” the 
Appellants listed the full estimated value of the residence, 
$230,000.  On Schedule D, Appellants listed Litton Home 
Loans as a creditor holding a secured claim of $113,657.86.  
On Schedule F, Appellants listed National Penn Bank as 
holding an unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of 
$396,171.13.  The amounts claimed on Schedule D and 
Schedule F were not referenced or listed on Schedule C. 
Appellee did not object to Appellants’ exemptions 
within the 30-day limit provided by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
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4003(b).2
 
  Before the 30-day limitation period ran, Appellants 
informed Appellee that there were certain defects related to 
the National Penn Bank mortgage; specifically, that it had not 
been properly acknowledged by the Appellants (signed before 
a notary) when it was executed.  According to Appellee and 
the banks, the mortgage’s defects in acknowledgement and 
recording made it defective as to subsequent purchasers and 
creditors, but not as to Appellants, who were the original 
parties to the mortgage agreement. 
Thereafter, using his ‘Strong-Arm’ powers pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 544(a), and relying on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:17-
3.1, Appellee sought to avoid the National Penn Bank 
mortgage lien on the residence, and to preserve the value of 
the avoided mortgage for the benefit of the estate, pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 551.3  The Trustee did so by filing a “Complaint 
to Avoid Mortgage and Other Liens,” against National Penn 
Bank and others, wherein he listed the residential property for 
sale, and submitted a sale offer to the Bankruptcy Court for 
approval.  Appellee also moved for an order authorizing that 
the sale of the residential property was free and clear of liens, 
claims and interests, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), with such 
liens claims and interests to attach to the sale proceeds.4
                                                 
2 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) requires an interested party to 
object to exemptions within 30 days of the initial creditors’ 
meeting or the filing of the amended Schedule C. 
  The 
3 The Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to eliminate some 
types of liens that interfere with an exemption claimed in the 
bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. § 551.   
4 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363 – Use, sale, or lease of property – 
The trustee or debtor-in-possession may sell property free and 
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motion was granted and the Bankruptcy Court issued a 
Consent Order, with no objection from Appellants.  The sale 
of the property was free and clear of all liens, and netted 
proceeds of $200,209.64.  After payment of subordinate liens 
and sale expenses, as well as certain other fees and expenses 
allowed by the Bankruptcy Court, Appellee retained 
approximately $41,733, pending the outcome of this appeal.5
 
  
The proceeds from the sale were placed into the bankruptcy 
estate. 
 Appellee also filed a notice of proposed settlement, 
where the National Penn Bank mortgage would be avoided, 
pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:17-3.1, and assigned to 
                                                                                                             
clear of an interest in the property provided that one or more 
of the provisions under Section 363(f) is satisfied.  Subsection 
(f) permits a trustee to sell property only if: 
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such 
property free and clear of such interest; 
 (2) such entity consents; 
 (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such 
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate 
value of all liens on such property; 
 (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or 
 (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or 
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of 
such interest.   
5 Appellants’ claim to substantially all of the remaining funds 
is the basis of this dispute.  There would have been $15,417 
remaining for the Trustee to apply to the estate debts if 
Appellants had received their exemption money. 
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Appellee by specific terms and the automatic assignment 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 551. 
 
After the sale of the property, Appellee filed a ‘Motion 
to Value the Debtors’s Exemption in their Former Residence 
at a Zero Value’ or in the alternative, ‘to Declare it 
[Appellants’ Exemption] Not to Extend to Sale Proceeds.’6
 
  
Appellee asserted that Appellants had no equity in their home 
to which the homestead exemption could attach, and because 
of the continuing validity of the National Penn Bank 
Mortgage assigned to them, Appellants’ claim of exemption 
in the residence was subordinate to, and did not extend to, 
Appellee’s rights to the sale proceeds as successor mortgagee, 
and therefore, Appellants’ exemption had no value.  As such, 
Appellants would be denied access to proceeds from the sale 
of the residence.   
Appellants cross-moved, seeking an order requiring 
Appellee to pay the claimed exemption of $37,150.  
Appellants contended that Appellee’s valuation motion was 
out of time and therefore barred by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) 
and the rule of Taylor7
                                                 
6 This motion was treated as an objection to the exemption. 
, and that, in any event, they were 
entitled to the exemption on the merits because the National 
Penn Bank mortgage was void as of the date and time of the 
filing of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy, rather than voidable by 
Appellee.   
7 In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that even when an 
exemption claimed on Schedule C is without legal 
justification, it will stand if no objection is made within 30 
days.  
8 
 
In a February 26, 2007 oral decision, the Bankruptcy 
Court granted the Trustee’s motion to value Debtors’ 
exemptions at zero and rejected Debtors’ claim that the 
National Penn Bank mortgage was void.  The Bankruptcy 
Court denied Debtors’ cross-motion to compel payment of 
their claimed exemptions, and held that Debtors had no 
“present or available future claim by way of exemption to any 
net proceeds of the sale of 251 Weymouth Road, Mullica 
Township, New Jersey which the Trustee received, is holding 
or previously disbursed.”  (App. 53.)  The Bankruptcy Court 
held that Debtors’ “claimed exemptions under § 522(d)(1) 
and (5) were improper, because those sections of the Code 
only authorize the exemption of home equity owned by the 
Debtors at the time of filing the petition.”  (Bankruptcy Tr. 
5:20-23, Feb. 26, 2007.)  The Bankruptcy Court also found 
that, because the amount owed on the two mortgages 
exceeded the value of the residence, the Debtors had no 
equity to claim as exempt.  Debtors claim that the National 
Penn mortgage was void rather than voidable was rejected by 
the Court, which found that under New Jersey law, the 
mortgage was only void against future creditors such as the 
Trustee, but was still valid against the Debtors. (Id.
 
 at 56:7-
12.) 
In addition, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
Trustee’s late objection was proper because the Debtors’ 
Schedule C failed to give the Trustee sufficient notice of their 
effort to seek exemptions in the proceeds of the sale of the 
residence.8  (Id.
                                                 
8 The Bankruptcy Court found that in order for the Debtors to 
claim the proceeds of the Trustee’s sale of the residence as 
exempt, they would have had to claim their exemption under 
 at 7:8-13.)  The Court also rejected the 
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Debtors’ argument that the Trustee’s late objection to their 
exemptions should be barred under Taylor, because by 
claiming their exemptions under § 522(d) instead of § 522(g), 
the Debtors had not given the Trustee sufficient notice of 
their intent to claim an exemption in the proceeds of the sale 
of the residence.  (Id.
 
 at 8:15-21.)  Consequently, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an Order on March 3, 2007, granting 
Trustee’s motion to value Debtors’ exemptions at zero. 
On April 10, 2007, Debtors filed an appeal of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order to the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, arguing that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in: (1) permitting Trustee’s late objection; (2) 
valuing the residence exemptions at zero; and (3) denying 
Debtors from claiming exemptions from the proceeds of the 
sale.   
 
On December 17, 2007, the District Court reversed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order, holding that, under Taylor
                                                                                                             
§ 522(g), which provides authority for debtors to claim 
exemptions in the proceeds of a sale following a trustee’s 
avoidance action in limited circumstances.  (Id. at 7:13-17.) 
, the 
Trustee’s motion was barred because he failed to timely 
object within the 30-day period provided by Rule 4003(b).  
The District Court held that the Debtors’ Schedules, taken as 
a whole, accurately listing the residence, the two mortgages 
and the amount claimed as exempt, and gave the Trustee 
adequate notice of the Debtors’ intent to claim their 
exemption from the value of the residence after the National 
Penn Bank mortgage was voided by the Trustee.  As a result, 
the District Court reversed the Order of the Bankruptcy Court 
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in favor of the Debtors and ordered that the matter be 
remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings.   
 
Appellee filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court, and 
oral argument was heard on March 3, 2009.  Before oral 
argument, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari in Schwab.  In Schwab, a trustee was barred from 
objecting to an improper exemption because it was past the 
30-day limit provided by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b), pursuant 
to the rule elucidated in Taylor.  The Third Circuit issued an 
Order on April 30, 2009, holding the appeal C.A.V. pending 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Schwab.  This Court 
also ordered supplemental briefs within ten days of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  On July 9, 2010, after oral 
argument, this Court issued an opinion indicating that because 
the District Court did not have the benefit of Schwab when it 
made its initial decision, its December 17, 2007 Order was 
vacated.  The matter was remanded to the District Court for 
redetermination in light of Schwab
 
.   
On remand, the District Court addressed whether, in 
light of the additional guidance provided by Schwab, 
Appellee had a duty to object to Appellants’ claimed 
exemptions within the 30-day time limit imposed by Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 4003(b).  On January 31, 2011, the District Court 
submitted its Opinion and Order, affirming the March 6, 2007 
Order of the Bankruptcy Court, and holding that Appellee had 
no duty to object within 30 days, under Schwab
 
.  On February 
14, 2011, Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal.   
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II. JURISDICTION 
 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to hear and 
determine Appellee’s motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1334(a) and (b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and (b).  The 
Bankruptcy Court also had jurisdiction related to a Standing 
Order of Reference entered by the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  The District Court had jurisdiction to 
review the Order of the Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a). 
 
 We have jurisdiction to review the Order of the 
District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. 
 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and the Role of the Trustee 
 When a party files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the 
United States Trustee appoints an impartial case trustee to 
administer the case and liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt 
assets.  11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704.  The Bankruptcy Code allows 
the debtor to keep “exempt” property, but a trustee liquidates 
the debtor’s remaining assets, which are now the property of 
the bankruptcy estate.  Id., Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541).  The Bankruptcy Code specifies 
the types of property debtors may exempt, as well as the 
maximum value of the exemptions a debtor may claim in 
certain assets.  Id.  Property a debtor claims as exempt will be 
excluded from the bankruptcy estate unless a party in interest 
objects.  Id.
 
  (Internal citations omitted.) 
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  The main role of a trustee in an asset case (such as this 
one) is to liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets in a manner 
that maximizes the return to the debtor’s unsecured creditors.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 721.  This occurs when the trustee sells the 
debtor’s property if it is free and clear of liens, as long as the 
property is not exempt, or if it is worth more than any security 
interest or lien attached to the property and any exemption 
that the debtor holds in the property.  Id.  The trustee may 
also attempt to recover money or property under his 
“avoidance powers,” which include the power to: (1) set aside 
preferential transfers made to creditors within 90 days before 
the petition; (2) undo security interests and other prepetition 
transfers of property that were not properly perfected under 
nonbankruptcy law at the time of the petition; and (3) pursue 
nonbankruptcy claims available under state law.  
 
Id. 
B. 
 
Schwab and Schedule C  
 In addition to the petition itself, the debtor also files a 
number of additional forms, including, but not limited to: (1) 
Schedules of assets and liabilities; (2) a Schedule of current 
income and expenditures; (3) a statement of financial affairs; 
and (4) a Schedule of executor contracts and unexpired 
leases.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b).  One of the Schedules that 
must be filed is Schedule C – “Property Claimed as Exempt”.  
Appellee argues that when the bankruptcy case was filed, 
there were two mortgages of record in the chain of title, one 
held by National Penn Bank, and one held by Litton Home 
Loans; neither of which were included on either the originally 
filed Schedule C list of exemptions claimed or the later 
amendment to Schedule C.  
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 In Schwab, the Supreme Court modified Taylor, 
holding that Rule 4003’s 30-day time limit applies to 
objections based on “three, and only three” elements of a 
claimed Schedule C exemption: (1) the description of the 
exempted property; (2) the Code provisions governing the 
claimed exemptions; and (3) the amount listed in the column 
titled “value of claimed exemption.”  Schwab, 130 S.Ct. at 
2663.  When the objection is based on other elements, the 
debtor’s market value estimation and the estate’s right to 
retain any value in the property beyond the value of the 
exempted interest, the 30-day time limit does not apply.  See 
id. at 2665, n.15.  According to the Supreme Court in 
Schwab, a trustee or other interested party has no obligation 
to object to an exemption claim unless the basis for that claim 
is found on the face of Schedule C.  See id. at 2665.  In 
addition, when determining whether an exemption is 
objectionable, Appellee only has to “evaluate the propriety of 
the claimed exemptions based on three, and only three, entries 
on Reilly’s Schedule C: the description of the [asset] in which 
[the debtor] claimed the exempt interests; the Code provisions 
governing the claimed exemptions; and the amounts [the 
debtors] listed in the column titled ‘value of claimed 
exemption.’” Id.
 
 at 2663.   
C. 
 
The National Penn Bank Mortgage and New Jersey 
 
Law 
 Under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor is 
allowed to protect specific property from creditors because 
that property is exempt under federal bankruptcy law or under 
the laws of the debtor’s home state.  11 U.S.C. § 522(b).  
Both parties in this case agree that state law governs the 
definition of property interests.  They also agree that the 
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National Penn Bank mortgage was defective in 
acknowledgment and recording, and falls within the category 
of “unregistered mortgages” discussed in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
46:17-3.1. 
 
 Both Appellants and Appellee rely on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
46:17-3.1 as support for their respective positions.  The 
statute reads: 
 
Every mortgage or conveyance in the nature of 
a mortgage of and for any lands, shall be void 
and of no effect against a subsequent judgment 
creditor, or bona fide purchaser, or mortgagee 
for a valuable consideration, not having notice 
thereof, unless such mortgage shall be 
acknowledged or proved according to law, and 
be recorded, either by registry as hereinbefore 
provided or by recording in full, or lodged for 
that purpose with the county recording office of 
the county in which such lands are situated, at 
or before the time of entering such judgment or 
of recording or lodging with said county 
recording officer, the said mortgage or 
conveyance to such subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee, provided nevertheless, that such 
mortgage as between the parties and their heirs 
shall be valid and operative. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:17-3.1 (repealed 2012). 
 
 Appellants argue that at the time the bankruptcy 
petition was filed, the National Penn Bank mortgage was void 
and of no effect.  Appellants claim that their property interests 
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were enhanced by Appellee’s exercise of his avoidance 
powers because the National Penn Bank mortgage was “void 
by statute and void by case law” immediately when they filed 
for bankruptcy, pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:17-3.1, and 
for that reason, they have equity in their residence.  They 
further argue that because of that equity, they properly 
selected the $36,900 exemption, pursuant to § 522(d)(1) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, and the $250 exemption, pursuant to § 
522(d)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 9
 
   
 In support of their position, Appellants cite to In re 
Buchholz, 224 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).  In Buchholz, 
the Bankruptcy Court held that under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:17-
3.1, an improperly recorded mortgage was “unsecured as of 
the date the petition was filed” against the Chapter 12 debtor 
in possession.  Id. at 23.  Appellants argue that just like the 
improperly recorded mortgage in Buchholz
 
, the National 
Penn Bank mortgage was improperly recorded and therefore 
void as against them.  Appellants also argue that the Court 
should allow their exemption in their residence because 
without the National Penn Bank mortgage they had an interest 
greater than their claimed exemptions. 
 Additionally, Appellants assert that when the 
bankruptcy petition was filed, the property reverted to the 
estate, giving Appellee all the rights, powers and status of a 
                                                 
9 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) provides that the aggregate interest is 
not to exceed $21,625 in value, in real property or personal 
property.  At the time Appellants filed, each debtor could 
exempt up to $18,450 of equity owned by the debtor.   
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), Appellants could claim an 
additional $1,150 per person as an exemption.  
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bona fide purchaser.  At the same time, the National Penn 
Bank mortgage became void and of no effect because it was 
not properly acknowledged.10
 
  Lastly, under New Jersey state 
law, the National Penn Bank did not have a valid secured 
claim and Appellants had the ability to exempt their interest 
in the property under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and (5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and did so. 
 Contrarily, Appellee urges that the National Penn 
Bank mortgage was not void upon filing, but was recorded in 
the chain of title of Appellants’ residence on the date of filing 
for bankruptcy.  As such, it was not invalid on its face.  
Appellee contends that unless there was some ruling by a 
court or some other filing, there was a “presumption of 
validity” regarding the National Penn Bank Mortgage.  
(Appellee Br. at 22.)  Appellee argues that “even a 
defectively recorded mortgage remains a presumptively valid 
lien on title until a court of competent jurisdiction makes a 
finding upon evidence that is clear, convincing and 
satisfactory that it is void.”  Id.
 
   
 Appellee asserts that the secured claim was void as to 
the claims of junior lienholders, but it was always valid as to 
Appellants.  (Appellee Br. at 10.)  Appellee claims that a 
valid recording is only required to preserve the priority of a 
mortgage against junior lien holders and bona fide purchasers 
for value without notice.  See Appellee Br. at 17, see also Cox 
v. RKA Corp.
                                                 
10 Appellants argue that because the National Penn Bank 
mortgage was not acknowledged in the presence of a notary 
public as required by law, it was not properly executed, and 
was therefore void under New Jersey state law. 
, 164 N.J. 487, 496-97 (N.J. 2000).  
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Furthermore, argues Appellee, Buchholz, upon which 
Appellants heavily relied, is inapposite.  In Buchholz
 
, the 
Bankruptcy Court held that because the mortgage was 
defectively acknowledged, the accompanying debt was 
unsecured under applicable New Jersey state law.  224 B.R. at 
23.  The Court also found that the debtor’s obligation to pay 
the loan was not eliminated under state law.  The 
acknowledgement, whether faulty or not, has no bearing on 
whether the mortgage is void. 
 In the present case, we find that National Penn Bank’s 
mortgage was unsecured as of the date the petition was filed, 
as it was defectively acknowledged, and failed to perfect 
National Penn Bank’s security interest.  However, Appellants 
are still obligated to pay the National Penn Bank mortgage 
under state law and the National Penn Bank mortgage was 
still valid as to Appellants.  See Buchholz, 224 B.R. at 23; see 
e.g., Moore v. Riddle
 
, 82 N.J. Eq. 197, 203 (Ch. 1913) (a 
certificate of acknowledgement is not essential to validity).   
 
 
Equity 
 Appellants argue that they are entitled to the 
exemption they claimed in their residence.  They argue that 
through Appellee’s sale, equity was created in the residence, 
to which the exemption they declared could attach.  We 
disagree. 
 
 At the time of the initial filing, Appellants’ property 
interest in their residence was subject to two mortgages, one 
of which was held by National Penn Bank.  Any equity in the 
property was subject to those mortgages.  Filing for 
bankruptcy does not create new property rights or value 
18 
 
where there previously were none.  See Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).  Appellants’ property interests 
were determined as of the date they filed for bankruptcy.  See 
Kollar v. Miller
 
, 176 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The 
estate is determined at the time of the initial filing of the 
bankruptcy petition . . .”).  There was no equity in the 
property to exempt at the time Appellants filed for 
bankruptcy, because the combination of the two mortgages 
was greater than the value of the exemption itself.  Appellants 
would either need to have avoidance powers similar to those 
of Appellee, or have the ability to benefit from the avoidance 
Appellee obtained from National Penn Bank.  Appellee 
claims that Appellants are not entitled to the proceeds from 
the avoidance but are only entitled to the equity in the 
residence, which Appellee claims is zero because the two 
mortgages totaled more than the estimated value of the 
property.  Appellee contends that Appellants are attempting to 
recover from the avoidance he obtained from National Penn 
Bank.   
  We have previously held that a debtor is not entitled 
to benefit from any avoidance.  In re Cybergenics Corp., 226 
F.3d 237, 244-47 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that courts have 
limited a debtor’s exercise of avoidance powers to 
circumstances in which such actions would in fact benefit the 
creditors, not the debtors themselves); see, e.g., Wellman v. 
Wellman (In re Wellman
section 522(i)(2)
), 933 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only 
if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate).  However, a 
debtor may benefit from an avoidance if he files an 
exemption, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).  “[T]he basic 
purpose of  is to make such property 
available to the debtor as well as the estate, but only as 
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expressly provided; that is, ‘to the extent that the debtor may 
exempt such property under subsection (g) [of section 522] or 
paragraph 1 of [section 522(i)]’.”  See In re Simonson
 
, 758 
F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1985).  Appellants very clearly stated 
that they had no intention of filing under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).  
As such, the fact that they filed for Chapter 7 but did not file 
for an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) precludes them 
from receiving anything from Appellee’s avoidance action. 
 The District Court correctly held that the avoidance of 
the National Penn Bank mortgage was a separate asset from 
that claimed as an exemption by Appellants, as they claimed 
an exemption in the residence, not in the proceeds from the 
sale of the residence.  
  
D. 
 
Timeliness of Appellee’s Objection to Appellants’ 
 
Claimed Exemption 
Appellants contend that Appellee failed to timely 
object to their claimed exemption, pursuant to Taylor and for 
that reason, they are entitled to their claimed exemptions.  
They argue that Appellee had forfeited his claim to any 
portion of the property value because he had not objected 
within 30 days, as provided by Rule 4003(b).  In Taylor, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that even when an 
exemption claimed on a Schedule C form is without legal 
justification; it will stand if no objection is made within 30 
days.  Id.
 
 at 643-44.   
However, Taylor is no longer controlling on this issue.  
As Appellants’ case was proceeding, the Supreme Court of 
the United States was considering similar issues in Schwab.  
20 
 
We held this case C.A.V. while the Supreme Court decided 
Schwab
 
, which now governs.   
In Schwab, the debtor (Reilly) filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, claiming exemptions in her business equipment, 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) and (6).  The trustee, 
Schwab, did not object to Reilly’s claimed exemptions 
because the dollar amount Reilly assigned to each exemption 
fell within the limits permissible pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
522(d)(5) and (6).11
 
  Because the appraisal of the exemption 
indicated that the total market value of Reilly’s business 
equipment could be as much as $17,200, the trustee petitioned 
the Bankruptcy Court for permission to auction the claimed 
equipment.  This would allow Reilly to receive the $10,718 
she claimed as exempt, and allow the estate to use the 
remaining proceeds to distribute to Reilly’s creditors.  Reilly 
objected to the petition, arguing that by equating the total 
value of the exemptions she claimed in the equipment with 
the equipment’s estimated market value on Schedule C, she 
had put Schwab and her creditors on notice that she intended 
to exempt the equipment’s full value, even if that amount 
turned out to be more than the dollar amount she declared, 
and more than the Bankruptcy Code allowed.  Reilly 
contended that because her Schedule C filing put the trustee 
on notice, the trustee was obligated to object within the 30 
day time period allowed under Rule 4003(b) and because he 
did not object, Schwab forfeited his claim to any value in the 
equipment.    
                                                 
11 Reilly claimed exemptions in her business equipment 
totaling $10,718.  
21 
 
The Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania agreed with Reilly, and denied Schwab’s 
motion to sell the equipment.  Schwab appealed to the District 
Court.  Id.  The District Court denied Schwab relief, rejecting 
his argument that neither the Code nor Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
4003(b) requires a trustee to object to a claimed exemption 
where the amount the debtor declares as the exemption’s 
value is within the limits the Code prescribes.  
 
Id. 
We held that “Schwab’s failure to object to Reilly’s 
claimed exemptions entitled Reilly to the equivalent of an in-
kind interest in her business equipment, even though the 
value of that exemption exceeded the amount that Reilly 
declared on Schedule C and the amount that the Code allowed 
her to withdraw from the bankruptcy estate.”  Id.
 
 at 2659.  We 
affirmed the District Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy 
Court.  The Trustee appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and 
clarified the trustee’s duty to object within 30 days.  The 
Supreme Court held that: 
 
“The issue is whether an interested party must 
object to a claimed exemption where, as here, 
the Code defines the property the debtor is 
authorized to exempt as an interest, the value of 
which may not exceed a certain dollar amount, 
in a particular type of asset, and the debtor’s 
schedule of exempt property accurately 
describes the asset and declares the ‘value of 
[the] claimed exemption’ in that asset to be an 
amount within the limits that the Code 
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prescribes.  Fed. Rule Bankr. Proc. Official 
Form 6, Schedule C (1991) (hereinafter 
Schedule C).  We hold that in cases such as this, 
an interested party need not object to an 
exemption claimed in this manner in order to 
preserve the estate’s ability to recover value in 
the asset beyond the dollar value the debtor 
declared exempt.”12
 
   
Id.
 
 at 2657.  
In the present case, Appellants claimed exemptions in 
the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) and (6).  
Although Appellee failed to object to the exemptions within 
the 30 day time limit prescribed by law, it did not result in an 
automatic forfeiture of his right to object, pursuant to 
Schwab.  Id. at 2658.  The District Court initially relied on the 
basis of Fed. R. Bankr. P.  4003(b) and Taylor.  Rule 4003(b) 
provides that “a party in interest may file an objection to the 
list of property claimed as exempt only within 30 days after 
… any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is 
filed.”  11 U.S.C. § 522(l) provides the consequences for 
failure to object: “unless a party in interest objects, the 
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”  We 
vacated and remanded to allow the District Court to 
reconsider in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schwab
 
.   
                                                 
12 The value of the claimed exemption may not exceed a 
certain dollar amount, in a particular type of asset, and the 
debtor’s Schedule of exempt property must accurately 
describe the asset.  Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658. 
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The District Court was required to make two 
determinations: (1) whether the Trustee’s late objection is 
barred by Rule 4003(b), regardless of the merits of the 
objection itself; and (2) if after Schwab
 
, the objection is not 
barred under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b), whether the Trustee’s 
objection should be upheld on the merits.  
In deciding the first question, the District Court was 
required to determine whether the asset the Debtors claimed 
as exempt on their amended Schedule C is the same asset that 
the Trustee was seeking to shield from Debtors.  The District 
Court reasoned that “[i]f the proceeds of the recovered 
National Penn mortgage are the same asset that Debtors 
claimed as exempt, then Trustee’s motion would seem to be 
merely an out-of-time objection to the value claimed as 
exempt, barred even after Schwab.”  (Messina v. Neuner (In 
re Messina), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9637, *19 (D.N.J. Jan. 
31, 2011)).  However, if “the asset claimed as exempt is a 
separate asset which Debtors then sought to reach through 
their claimed exemption, then Trustee’s objection, after 
Schwab, would not be barred by Rule 4003(b).”  Id.  The 
District Court found that the Debtors’ amended Schedule C 
claimed an exemption in only the equity in the residence 
owned by Debtors at the time they filed their petition.  Id. at 
*17.  The Court reasoned that “[w]ere the proceeds of an 
avoided mortgage deemed to be reachable under § 522(d) 
despite the language of § 550, there would be no need for the 
separate subsection of § 522(g).”  Id.
 
 at *20. 
The District Court also found that the Trustee’s 
objection “was not time-barred because he had no duty to 
object within 30 days under Schwab.”  The Court concluded 
that “the Trustee’s objection, to applying Debtors’ claimed 
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exemption in the equity in their house to the separate asset of 
proceeds recovered by the Trustee’s voidance of the National 
Penn mortgage, falls outside of the three elements of 
Schedule C identified in Schwab, and is therefore not subject 
to Rule 4003(b)(2)’s 30-day limitation.”  Id.
 
 at *21-22. 
The second question the District Court addressed was 
whether to affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling on the 
merits.  The Trustee argued that the National Penn Bank 
mortgage continued to be valid as against the Debtors at the 
date they filed their Chapter 7 petition.  The Trustee also 
distinguished Buchholz
 
, in that as a Chapter 12 debtor in 
possession, the debtor in that case possessed the avoidance 
powers of the trustee.  Those powers are not available to the 
Chapter 7 Debtors in this case.   
The District Court agreed with the Trustee’s reasoning, 
stating that “the holding of In re Buchholz is not applicable in 
a case where, as here, the Debtors are not acting pursuant to 
the voidance powers of a debtor in possession.”  (In re 
Messina, at *25.)  The District Court held that “Buchholz is 
not applicable to a Chapter 7 debtor as found in this case, and 
that consequently, the National Penn mortgage was not 
automatically void as against Debtors on the date the petition 
was filed.  As a result, the Trustee is correct that Debtors did 
not have an equity interest in their residence to claim as 
exempt on their Schedule C.”  Id.
 
 at *26. 
The District Court concluded “after careful analysis of 
the record before it, that the Trustee had no duty to object to 
Debtors’ effort to extend their claimed exemption in the 
equity of their residence to the separate asset of the recovered 
National Penn mortgage within 30 days, and that the 
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Bankruptcy Court therefore properly considered Trustee’s 
objection.”  Id.
 
   The District Court also concluded that the 
Bankruptcy Court properly granted Trustee’s motion to value 
at zero Debtors’ claimed exemptions in their residence. 
The District Court applied Schwab appropriately and 
concluded that the 30-day time period in which to object to 
Appellants’ exemptions under Rule 4003(b) did not preclude 
the Trustee from objecting.  The Trustee’s objection was 
timely.  Further, the Trustee’s objection is valid.  Appellants 
did not provide sufficient notice through their disclosure in 
Schedule C that they intended to exempt the property’s full 
value.  Under Schwab
 
, Appellee must prevail. 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we shall affirm the 
Order of the District Court.    
